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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-1761 
___________ 
 
FENG ZHI LI; YU FANG CHEN; 
 ZHU YU CHEN; ZHEN HUA CHEN, 
                Petitioners 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
                Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(A96-109-436; A96-109-435; A96-109-434; A96-109-433) 
Immigration Judge:  Hon. Grace A. Sease 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 2, 2012 
Before:  SMITH, HARDIMAN AND ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  July 17, 2012) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Feng Zhi Li and her children, Zhen Hua Chen, Yu Fang Chen, and Zhu Yu Chen 
(as derivative beneficiaries), petition for review of an order of the Board of Immigration 
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Appeals (“BIA”) denying a motion to reopen.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny 
the petition for review. 
I. 
 Inasmuch as we are writing primarily for the parties and have previously discussed 
the background of the case, see Feng Zhi Li v. Att’y Gen., 379 F. App’x 235 (3d Cir. 
2010), we will recite the facts only as necessary to our decision.  Li and her children, all 
natives of Fujian Province in the People’s Republic of China, conceded removability and 
applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the United Nations 
Convention Against Torture.  Li claimed that she was entitled to relief because she and 
her husband, who remains in China, had not complied with family planning regulations in 
Fujian Province, and that her husband had been forcibly sterilized as a result.  An 
Immigration Judge found that Li’s claim was not credible due in part to her submission of 
an inconsistent and unauthenticated letter purportedly written by Chinese officials to 
corroborate her husband’s sterilization.1
 Li filed a motion to reconsider, which the BIA denied in 2006.  We dismissed her 
petition for review of that denial because the only claim that she raised—ineffective 
  Her applications were therefore denied.  The 
BIA affirmed the denial of relief, and Li did not seek review. 
                                              
1 At the time of Li’s removal proceedings, an applicant who had established that his or 
her spouse had undergone a forced abortion or sterilization procedure was per se entitled 
to refugee status.  In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915 (BIA 1997) (en banc).  The 
presumption of asylum eligibility based on a spouse’s forced abortion or sterilization no 
longer applies.  See Lin-Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc); In 
re J-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 520 (A.G. 2008). 
3 
 
assistance of counsel—had not been raised below.  C.A. No. 06–4155.  Li then filed a 
motion to reopen with the BIA, alleging changed country conditions and ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  The motion was denied in 2008, and Li sought review.  She 
pursued only her ineffectiveness claim before this Court, and we denied the petition for 
review, concluding that the underlying motion to reopen was properly denied.  Li
 Li filed a second motion to reopen in 2011, again claiming changed country 
conditions in China.  She alleged that because the BIA did not credit her claim that her 
husband was sterilized, it should consider whether she herself has a well-founded fear of 
being forcibly sterilized.  The BIA denied the motion, concluding that the evidence Li 
submitted did not establish that reopening was warranted based on changed 
circumstances. 
, 379 F. 
App’x at 239-40. 
II. 
 Li now seeks review of the BIA’s March 2, 2011 decision denying her second 
motion to reopen.2  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  The BIA’s denial 
of a motion to reopen is reviewed for an abuse of discretion and will not be disturbed 
unless it was arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.  Fadiga v. Att’y Gen.
                                              
2 After she filed this petition for review, Li filed a motion with the BIA to reconsider the 
denial of her motion to reopen.  The BIA denied the motion to reconsider on November 
22, 2011, and Li did not petition for review of that denial.  Our review of the present case 
is therefore limited to the BIA’s March 2, 2011 decision. 
, 488 F.3d 142, 
153 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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 An alien may file only one motion to reopen with the BIA and must do so within 
90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i).  However, these limitations do not apply to motions to reopen 
seeking asylum or withholding of removal based on changed circumstances arising in the 
country of nationality, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not 
have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 
Zheng v. Att’y Gen.
 Li does not dispute that the BIA correctly determined that the motion to reopen 
was untimely and number-barred.  In addition, we agree with the BIA that the evidence 
Li submitted with her motion to reopen was insufficient to demonstrate changed 
circumstances.  To support her contention that circumstances in China have changed such 
that she faces an increased likelihood of forced sterilization should she return, Li 
submitted a photocopy of an unsigned letter purportedly written to her husband by the 
Population and Birth Control Bureau of Changle City, as well as letters and photographs 
of two Chinese women who claimed that they had been forcibly sterilized for failure to 
comply with family-planning policies. 
, 549 F.3d 260, 265 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 Li argues that the BIA erred by rejecting the Population and Birth Control Bureau 
letter for lack of authentication.  Official records entered into evidence in any proceeding 
before an Immigration Judge or the BIA must be authenticated.  8 C.F.R. § 1287.6.  
Although authentication need not be accomplished solely by the methods set forth in 
§ 1287.6, see Liu v. Ashcroft, 372 F.3d 529, 533 (3d Cir. 2004), Li failed to authenticate 
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the purported letter by any means.  We perceive no abuse of discretion in the BIA 
requiring Li to authenticate the letter, especially in light of the fact that it was obtained by 
her husband, who had previously procured another unauthenticated letter that was 
rejected.  See Chen v. Att’y Gen.
 Li’s remaining submissions likewise do not indicate that her case should have 
been reopened.  The affidavits of two women apparently forced to undergo sterilization 
do not establish a change in conditions in China such that Li is at an increased risk of 
persecution.  To the contrary, the Immigration Judge’s 2004 opinion denying Li’s 
applications for relief from removal noted instances of forced sterilization in Fujian 
Province.  Evidence of two isolated incidents occurring over the span of several years 
does not reflect a material change in conditions. 
, 676 F.3d 112, 117 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 Li also argues that the BIA should have considered additional evidence, including 
a 2006 State Department Country Report that was not submitted with her present motion 
to reopen, but which she had produced in earlier proceedings before the BIA.  In support 
of this contention, Li notes that we cited the 2006 Country Report in Huang v. Attorney 
General, 620 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2010).  Although Huang involved the BIA’s failure to 
discuss the 2006 Country Report, we did not hold that the Board must address evidence 
that the petitioner had previously submitted.  Indeed, because a motion to reopen based 
on changed conditions may only be granted if the alien produces material evidence that 
was “not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous 
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proceeding,” § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), the BIA did not err by failing to reconsider previously 
submitted materials that Li did not attach to her motion to reopen.3
III. 
 
 In sum, because the BIA properly concluded that Li did not satisfy the exception 
to the time and numerical limitations for filing a motion to reopen based on changed 
country conditions, we will deny the petition for review. 
                                              
3 To the extent that Li argued that her motion to reopen should have been granted in light 
of factual similarities between her circumstances and those at issue in Huang, we note 
that the opinion she attached to her motion to reopen does not itself constitute evidence of 
changed country conditions. 
